

15 OCTOBER 1973

OPENING REMARKS by STANSFIELD TURNER,
ADDRESSED TO THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL
SEAPOWER SYMPOSIUM

NAVY review(s) completed.

THIRD INTERNATIONAL SEAPOWER
SYMPOSIUM

Opening Remarks

by

Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner

15 October 1973

I would like officially to open the Third International Seapower Symposium and note to you that we're even seven minutes ahead of schedule, an unprecedented event. But we have so much to do and to discuss this week that we must take advantage of every minute. May I also officially and personally extend my warm welcome to you from the United States Naval War College. We are honored and pleased to have you with us this week. We will attempt to do everything we can to make your week both professionally rewarding and personally pleasureable. If at any time there is something we can do I hope you will let us know promptly. We would like to be of any assistance possible.

I could, and perhaps should, in opening this symposium introduce the number of distinguished senior naval officers who are with us today. I will not do so for two reasons. First, there are so many I am not sure where I would stop. Second, I hope we will be very informal this week and not require fancy introductions. Instead, I hope we can simply get to know each other closely and personally. I would like to pause though to introduce one person; a man whose concept the International Seapower Symposium was from the beginning, whose guidance and inspiration have kept it going for the four years it has been in existence, and who more than any other individual is responsible for our being together this week to share ideas.

May I ask Admiral Richard Colbert, Commander Naval Forces, Southern Europe, to stand and be acknowledged.

And now may I say just a word or two as background to the theme of the conference "International Naval Cooperation Particularly in a Peace Time Environment." As naval officers we do not need to be reminded that our primary task in life is to be prepared for the military threat. Each of us has a somewhat different threat to be prepared for, but we also have much in common. I would not presume to review the threat with you now. I know Admiral Zumwalt, who will follow me, will give you some of his broad-ranging perspectives, and I hope that throughout this week we will hear from a number of you also. I would like to suggest, however, that there are new threats sneaking up on all of us, dangers which we share and dangers which we do not discuss often or systematically. But these are dangers which could erode our capability to meet our primary requirement of readiness for the military threat. I would like to mention three. One stems from the rapidly increasing emphasis throughout the world on developing the resources of the sea beds and the oceans. Today there are already over 15,000 off-shore oil rigs, each with associated tanks and pipes, some submerged and some not. It is clear that rules of some sort are going to be necessary soon for navigational safety in these areas of the world's oceans.

Rules of navigation could be used here, however, as another way of excluding naval shipping from certain areas. In short, we naval types may feel that with provisions for freedom of passage or freedom of transit under the law of the sea our movements will be protected. This may not, in fact, be the case. We might even envisage the day when these off-shore operations because of their depth and numbers may interfere by sound or by sheer obstruction with anti-submarine operations in those areas of the ocean.

And must we not as naval officers be concerned for what our political leaders will expect of us in terms of enforcing rights of sovereignty over resource development in the oceans? How do we avoid conflicts developing over jurisdictional disputes on resource development? Should we not be concerned that our ability to work together cooperatively against the primary military threat can be endangered by disputes over ocean resources? And will our domestic internal pressures to protect these sea bed resources possibly lead to reallocation of our naval resources and redesign of our naval forces? Do we not have to be concerned that we could be forced into a lot of patrol and protection operations which could detract from our training and readiness? Do we not have to be concerned that we could be forced into design of naval forces which are optimized for patrol and protection rather than for fighting? After all, we must be careful to ensure that such pressures do not impinge on our ultimate capabilities.

The second danger I would like to suggest derives from the efforts throughout the world today to limit pollution. It is obvious to all of us that this can and will have a budgetary impact on our Navy. We are the most conspicuous target, even though we are not really major offenders in polluting the oceans. And, here again, should we not be concerned with threats to freedom of movement of naval forces by ecological rulings? Some of these may be unintentional but others may be Machiavellian efforts to discriminate against particular nationalities or particular types of ships, such as warships.

Thirdly, I would like to suggest that we face a common threat or danger in the impact of detente. Will we each be able to obtain the financial and the personnel resources which we require in an era of world wide detente and a decreasing public interest in military matters? Is it not possible that international naval cooperation can help us in both of these regards? Cooperation can help us in developing public support to generate financial resources and in giving to the young men and women who join the naval service a sense of dedication and participation in worthwhile activities. There are many areas for this kind of cooperation and I'm sure we will discuss them this week.

Finally, is it not we in the military who are the most skilled in cooperation on an international basis? Can we and should we not in these days set an example for the economist, the

diplomatist, the agriculturalist, the industrialist, and the others who are attempting to forge links of international relationships? In so doing, we cannot only help further their efforts but we can do a great deal to preserve that sense of cooperation between the free nations of the world which, I would suggest, is going to be critical as we continue to probe and explore the possibility of detente with the Communist side of the world.

In conclusion our ability as naval officers to maintain the forces which we are going to need to meet the primary threat is indeed on-the-line today. We all know how serious it would be to disarm unilaterally under these circumstances. I suggest that we must explore every technique of preserving those capabilities in this era of detente. I hope we will find stimulating suggestions and solutions which we can work [] on in common during our five days of discussions here.

Again, welcome. We are so delighted to have you with us. Thank you.

X 10/10
FINAL

13 October 1973

OUTLINE OF REMARKS

10/10
FOR

3ISS

I. Our task is to be prepared to meet the military threat.

Each accustomed to evaluating the military threat we face

Each has a somewhat different military threat to

consider but all some common element

I - not presume - Z give his wide ranging perspective-

Hope to hear from many of you.

II. Like to suggest - New threats sneaking up on all of us -

threats we have in common. *Other* Threats we do not discuss often

or treat systematically - but which could erode our

capability to handle the primary military threat.

A. *One of two steps* Threats from the rapidly increasing efforts around

the world to tap the resources of the oceans.

1. • Navigation

There are today already 15,000 off-shore

oil rigs - concentrated few areas - these each have tanks and pipelines, some of which are submerged and some of which are on the surface.

• Some sort of rules will be soon mandatory for safety and navigation - states with exclusive rights for resource development could well attempt to use rules of navigation as a way of excluding other shipping from this zone, despite any rules we may make on freedom of transit.

In short, we naval types may assume that if there are provisions for freedom of transit or passage in whatever law of the sea we develop our rights of movement will be protected. This simply may not be adequate.

2. Naval Tactics

- When look closer to our professional skills, is it possible that there will be so many platforms in ~~some~~ areas that ^{of platforms} the resulting noise in the water that will cause particular problems in ASW?

3. Sovereignty

- What can we expect our political leaders to demand of us in enforcement of rights of sovereignty over resources of the ocean - ~~especially if these rights are considerably extended? How does a minor or non-naval nation, for instance, protect its rights in an exclusive resource zone?~~ How do we avoid conflicts from developing over jurisdictional disputes on resource development - should we not be concerned that our ability to work together against

the primary military threat can be endangered by disputes over ocean resources?

Do we not even have to be concerned

~~at~~ at terrorism and sabotage of ocean platforms that could disrupt friendships and cooperative naval efforts.

• National or terrorist sabotage of undersea resource development activities looks appealingly easy and could consume extensive naval resources to defend against.

4. Will national pressures to protect commerical sea bed interests force reallocations of naval resources and ~~and~~ redesign of naval forces?

- There is a threat that we could be forced into a lot of patrol and protection duties that might detract seriously from training and deployments.
- There is also a threat that the design of our forces might be optimized ~~against our own interests and~~ against the wrong threat.
- Will we want more surface ships - or can surface ships protect these various rights?
- Will we want more small ships and faster ships?
- What about the Air Force and air surveillance of these zones and satellites?

~~Can we accept such pressures and still retain war fighting capabilities.~~

B. Second area of threat is from the drive for ecology

1. Obvious problems of budgetary impact.

We Navies are conspicuous targets - even though not major offenders.

2. Threats to freedom of movement from ecological rulings -
Unintentional -

Machiavellain -

e.g. rules against vessels with ordnance and av
gas - i.e. carriers

C. Euphoria -

Threat today to over optimistic sense of euphoria of detente.

- Detente is not a black and white affair. It is a fragile and precarious effort to develop trust and confidence. *over time*
- Vital that our free nations maintain a sense of cohesion, friendship and cooperation as we test the ~~winds of~~ detente.
 - 1. Cooperation among the free nations of the world *on* ~~with~~ during the past 25 years has been particularly good in the military sphere.
 - 2. With the arrival of an atmosphere of detente *and* ~~and~~ lesser interest in military matters, the free nations *will* are going to find it ~~even more~~ necessary to cooperate in areas of economics, trade, tariffs, and

diplomacy. Unless we build such mutual areas to help replace military cooperative efforts we may well be in trouble.

3. ~~Military~~ international ^{multilateral} cooperation on non-military matters such as ecology, safety of life, etc. could be a help in building ~~from our example of~~ military cooperation into cooperation in other fields. ^{4/13} *in an era of détente & easing of our actions*

D. ~~Third~~ Common threat that of lack of understanding of publics & politicians of need for military force in era of détente and primary focus on economic achievements.

^W All face both financial and personnel problems in a *changing life* varying degrees.

Cooperative naval actions may help in both directions - that is generate public support and give individuals in naval service a sense of participation in a desirable activity.

1. Protection of life at sea
2. Weather prediction
3. Protection against terrorism at sea and in the air.
4. Enforcement of ecological protection *rules*
5. Enforcement of other rules of international law
- 6.
- 7.

Note example of how much favorable publicity and sense of easing of tensions has been generated by U.S. - Soviet joint space effort.

Our ability to maintain the forces we need to meet the primary threat is on the line - we all know how serious it would be to unilaterally disarm today

Navies of the World will have greater responsibilities and more freedom to deter and persuade than air or ground forces.

We must look at every technique to preserve our capabilities.

TENTATIVE LISTING OF PARTICIPANTS AND OBSERVERS, THIRD INTERNATIONAL SEAPOWER SYMPOSIUM

Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600120001-3

4 OCTOBER 1973 REVISION

F

ARGENTINA

Rear Admiral Jose Angel ALVAREZ (NCC 1969)

AUSTRALIA

Rear Admiral Hugh D. STEVENSON, CBE
COMO Robert Henry PERCY

BELGIUM

Commodore J. P. VAN DYCK
Colonel Willy H. GONTIER

BOLIVIA

Captain Gutemberg BARROSO Hurtado

BRAZIL

Rear Admiral IBSEN de Gusmao Camara
Captain Francisco ARIPENA Leao Feitosa

CANADA

Rear Admiral R. H. LEIR

CHILE

Possible Attendee

CHINA

Vice Admiral LIU Ting-pang (NCC 1962)
Rear Admiral CHOH Tsu Hsing

COLOMBIA

Vice Admiral Jose Alfonso DIAZ Osorio (NCC 1966)

DENMARK

Rear Admiral N. F. LANGE

ECUADOR

Rear Admiral Jorge Hernando ORTEGA Ortega

ETHIOPIA

Commander NEGASH Zelleke (NCC 1974)
Commander KIFLE Worku (NCC 1973)

FINLAND

COMO Jorma E. HAAPKYLÄ

FRANCE

Vice Admiral Jean E. TELLIER
Rear Admiral Andre R. GELINET

GERMANY

Vice Admiral Heinrich G.L.J. KUEHNLE

GREECE

Vice Admiral Peter J. ARAPAKIS (NCC 1961)
COMO Spyridon S. KAPSALIS (NCC 1964)

GUATEMALA

Colonel Luis Rene MENDOZA Palomo

HAITI

Possible Attendee

ICELAND

Mr. Pietre SIGURDSSON (OBSERVER)

INDIA

Rear Admiral RKS GHANDHI (NCC 1964)

INDONESIA

Rear Admiral Walujo SUGITO
Colonel Abdul MADJID (NCC 1971)

IRAN

Rear Admiral Houshang ARYANPOUR
Rear Admiral Kamal HABIBELAHI (NCC 1968)

IRELAND

Captain Peter KAVANAGH

ITALY

Vice Admiral Gino DE GIORGI (NCC 1961)
Captain Pietro SCAGLIUSI

Vice Admiral Kiyonori KUNISHIMA (NCC 1962) (OBSERVER)
Rear Admiral Hideo KATORI (NCC 1966) (OBSERVER)

KOREA

COMO AN, Pyong Ki

LEBANON

Lieutenant Colonel Fares LAHOUD (NCC 1974) (Tentative)

NETHERLANDS

Vice Admiral E. ROEST
Captain Pieter J. DIERX

NEW ZEALAND

Rear Admiral E.C. THORNE, CBE
Captain K. Michael SAULL

NORWAY

Rear Admiral Oddmund P. AKENES

PAKISTAN

COMO Karamat Rahman NIAZI
Captain Khan Hasan ZIA

PARAGUAY

Captain Ruben Dario LEZCANO

PHILIPPINES

COMO Ernesto R. OGBINAR

SPAIN

Vice Admiral Luis AREVALO Pelluz

SWEDEN

Vice Admiral B.G.G. LUNDVALL
LtGeneral Bo WESTIN

THAILAND

Admiral KAWEE Singha
Vice Admiral KET Santivejkul (NCC 1962)

TUNISIA

Captain Bechir JEDIDI (NCC 1972)

TURKEY

Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600120001-3

Rear Admiral Dogan TOKTAMIS
Captain Mustafa TURUNCOGLU

UNITED KINGDOM

Admiral Sir Andrew M. LEWIS, KCB
Rear Admiral J.H.F. EBERLE

VENEZUELA

Rear Admiral Enrique DOMINGUEZ Garcia
Rear Admiral Ernesto REYES Leal

VIETNAM

Rear Admiral Tran Van CHON (NCC 1960)
Lieutenant General Vinh LOC

COMNAVSOUTH

Admiral Giuseppe PIGHINI (NCC 1958) (OBSERVER)

UNITED STATES

Under Secretary of the Navy, Mr. J. William MIDDENDORF, II (10/18)
Admiral Elmo R. ZUMWALT, Jr., U.S. Navy (All week, except Tues A.M. & Ret Tues. P.M.)
Admiral Richard G. COBERT, U.S. Navy (Former Dir., NCC 1957-58) (Pres. 1968-71) (All week)
Vice Admiral Stansfield TURNER, U.S. Navy (All week)
Vice Admiral Julien J. LE BOURGEOIS, U.S. Navy (All week)
Vice Admiral Malcolm W. CAGLE, U.S. Navy (10/18 and 10/19 only)
Vice Admiral William W. BEHRENS, U.S. Navy (10/17)
Rear Admiral Charles S. WILLIAMS, U.S. Navy (All week)
Rear Admiral Charles D. GROJEAN, U.S. Navy (All week)
Vice Admiral Benjamin F. ENGEL, U.S.C.G. (10/15 and 10/16)
Rear Admiral James A. PALMER, U.S.C.G. (All week)
Captain Joseph A. D'EMIDIO, U.S. Navy (All week)
Mr. Joseph E. KASPUTYS (10/18)
Mr. Herbert S. OKUN
Vice Admiral John T. HAYWARD, U.S. Navy (Ret.) (All week)
Vice Admiral Raymond E. PEET, U.S. Navy (1 or 2 days)
Captain Clarence C. HOBDY, U.S.C.G.
Captain Robert W. DURFEY, U.S.C.G.
Captain Anthony F. FUGARO, U.S.C.G.
Commander Harry J. RECKITT, U.S.C.G.
Lieutenant Commander Peter A. JOSEPH, U.S.C.G.
Captain Clarence O. Fiske, U.S. Navy

3 OCTOBER 1973

Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600120001-3

OTHER NON-PARTICIPANTS AND OBSERVER PERSONNEL, THIRD INTERNATIONAL SEAPOWER SYMPOSIUM

CANADA

COMMODORE Andrew COLLIER, Naval Attache

GERMANY

Captain Andreas WIESE, Naval Attache
LCDR Reiss, Aide

GREECE

Captain Christos DOUZINAS, Naval Attache (Observer) (NCC 1970)
LCDR Kavallieros - Aide

INDONESIA

Colonel R.M. SANTOSO, Naval Attache

ITALY

Captain Mario PORTO, Naval Attache

JAPAN

Captain Yasuhiro TAMAGWA, Naval Attache

PHILIPPINES

Captain Ramon MADRID, Naval Attache

SWEDEN

Captain Lennart Nils LINDGREN, Naval Attache

THAILAND

LCDR WICHITIR Chumnkarn - Aide

VENEZUELA

Rear Admiral Enrique PENA PENA, Naval Attache

VIETNAM

Captain Nguyen Van Tai, Flag Secretary to CNO
LCDR Van Trung Quan - Personal Aide

COMNAVSOUTH

CDR F. Ruggerio - Aide

Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600120001-3

10 OCTOBER 1973 REVISION

ARGENTINA

Rear Admiral Jose Angel ALVAREZ (NCC 1969)

F

AUSTRALIA

Rear Admiral Hugh D. STEVENSON, CBE
COMO Robert Henry PERCY

BELGIUM

Commodore J. P. VAN DYCK
Colonel Willy H. GONTIER

BOLIVIA

Captain Gutemberg BARROSO Hurtado

BRAZIL

Rear Admiral IBSEN de Gusmao Camara
Captain Francisco ARIPENA Leao Feitosa

CANADA

Rear Admiral R. H. LEIR

CHILE

Possible Attendee

CHINA

Vice Admiral LIU Ting-pang (NCC 1962)
Rear Admiral CHOH Tsu Hsing

COLOMBIA

Vice Admiral Jose Alfonso DIAZ Osorio (NCC 1966)

DENMARK

Rear Admiral N. F. LANGE

ECUADOR

Rear Admiral Jorge Hernando ORTEGA Ortega

ETHIOPIA

Commander KIFLE Worku (NCC 1973)
Commander NEGASH Zelleke (NCC 1974)

FINLAND

COMO Jorma E. HAAPKYLÄ

FRANCE

Vice Admiral Jean E. TELLIER
Rear Admiral Andre R. GELINET

GERMANY

Vice Admiral Heinrich G.L.J. KUEHNLE

GREECE

Vice Admiral Peter J. ARAPAKIS (NCC 1961)
COMO Spyridon S. KAPSALIS (NCC 1964)

GUATEMALA

Colonel Luis Rene MENDOZA Palomo

HAITI

Possible Attendee

ICELAND

Mr. Pietre SIGURDSSON (OBSERVER)

INDIA

Rear Admiral RKS GHANDHI (NCC 1964)

INDONESIA

Rear Admiral Walujo SUGITO
Colonel Abdul MADJID (NCC 1971)

IRAN

Captain Nassrollah MOVAGHARI (NCC 1970)

IRELAND

Captain Peter KAVANAGH

ITALY

Admiral Gino DE GIORGI (NCC 1961)
Captain Pietro SCAGLIUSI

Vice Admiral Kiyonori KUNISHIMA (NCC 1962) (OBSERVER)
Rear Admiral Hideo KATORI (NCC 1966) (OBSERVER)

KOREA

COMO AN, Pyong Ki

LEBANON

Lieutenant Colonel Fares LAHOUD (NCC 1974)

NETHERLANDS

Vice Admiral E. ROEST
Captain Pieter J. DIERX

NEW ZEALAND

Rear Admiral E.C. THORNE, CBE
Captain K. Michael SAULL

NORWAY

Rear Admiral Oddmund P. AKENES

PAKISTAN

COMO Karamat Rahman NIAZI
Captain Khan Hasan ZIA

PARAGUAY

Captain Ruben Dario LEZCANO

PHILIPPINES

COMO Ernesto R. OGBINAR

SPAIN

Vice Admiral Luis AREVALO Pelluz

SWEDEN

Vice Admiral B.G.G. LUNDVALL
LtGeneral Bo WESTIN

THAILAND

Admiral KAWEE Singha
Vice Admiral KET Santivejkul (NCC 1962)

TUNISIA

Captain Bachir JEDIDI (NCC 1972)

TURKEY

Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600120001-3

Rear Admiral Dogan TOKTAMIS
Captain Mustafa TURUNCOGLU

UNITED KINGDOM

Admiral Sir Andrew M. LEWIS, KCB
Rear Admiral J.H.F. EBERLE

VENEZUELA

Rear Admiral Enrique DOMINGUEZ Garcia
Rear Admiral Ernesto REYES Leal

VIETNAM

Rear Admiral Tran Van CHON (NCC 1960)
Lieutenant General Vinh LOC

COMNAVSOUTH

Admiral Giuseppe PIGHINI (NCC 1958) (OBSERVER)

UNITED STATES

Under Secretary of the Navy, Mr. J. William MIDDENDORF, II (10/18)
Admiral Elmo R. ZUMWALT, Jr., U.S. Navy (All week, except Tues A.M. & Ret Tues. P.M.)
Admiral Richard G. COLBERT, U.S. Navy (Former Dir., NCC 1957-58) (Pres. 1968-71) (All week)
Vice Admiral Stansfield TURNER, U.S. Navy (All week)
Vice Admiral Julien J. LE BOURGEOIS, U.S. Navy (All week)
Vice Admiral Malcolm W. CAGLE, U.S. Navy (10/18 and 10/19 only)
Vice Admiral William W. BEHRENS, U.S. Navy (10/17)
Rear Admiral Charles S. WILLIAMS, U.S. Navy (All week)
Rear Admiral Charles D. GROJEAN, U.S. Navy (All week)
Vice Admiral Benjamin F. ENGEL, U.S.C.G. (10/15 and 10/16)
Rear Admiral James A. PALMER, U.S.C.G. (All week)
Captain Joseph A. D'EMIDIO, U.S. Navy (All week)
Mr. Joseph E. KASPUTYS (10/18)
Mr. Herbert S. OKUN
Vice Admiral John T. HAYWARD, U.S. Navy (Ret.) (All week)
Vice Admiral Raymond E. PEET, U.S. Navy (1 or 2 days)
Captain Clarence C. HOODY, U.S.C.G.
Captain Robert W. DURFEY, U.S.C.G.
Captain Anthony F. FUGARO, U.S.C.G.
Commander Harry J. RECKITT, U.S.C.G.
Lieutenant Commander Peter A. JOSEPH, U.S.C.G.
Captain Clarence O. Fiske, U.S. Navy, Director, Third International Seapower Symposium

2 OCTOBER 1973 REVISION

ARGENTINA

Rear Admiral Jose Angel ALVAREZ (NCC 1969)

AUSTRALIA

Rear Admiral Hugh D. STEVENSON, CBE
COMO Robert Henry PERCY
BELGIUM

Rear Admiral J. P. VAN DYCK
Colonel Willy H. GONTIER

BOLIVIA

Captain Gutemberg BARROSO Hurtado

BRAZIL

Rear Admiral IBSEN de Gusmao Camara
Captain Francisco ARIPENA Leao Feitosa

CANADA

Rear Admiral R. H. LEIR

CHILE

Possible Attendee

CHINA

Vice Admiral LIU Ting-pang (NCC 1962)
Rear Admiral CHO Tsu Hsing

COLOMBIA

Vice Admiral Jose Alfonso DIAZ Osorio (NCC 1966)

DENMARK

Rear Admiral N. F. LANGE

ECUADOR

Rear Admiral Jorge Hernando ORTEGA Ortega

ETHIOPIA

Commander NEGASH Zelleke (NCC 1974) (Tentative)
Commander KIFLE Worku (NCC 1973) (Tentative)

FINLAND

COMO Jorma E. HAAPKYLA

FRANCE

Vice Admiral Jean E. TELLIER
Rear Admiral Andre R. GELINET

GERMANY

Vice Admiral Heinrich G.L.J. KUEHNLE

GREECE

Vice Admiral Peter J. ARAPAKIS (NCC 1961)
COMO Spyridon S. KAPSALIS (NCC 1964)

GUATEMALA

Colonel Luis Rene MENDOZA Palomo

HAITI

Possible Attendee

ICELAND

Mr. Pietre SIGURDSSON (OBSERVER)

INDIA

Rear Admiral RKS GHANDHI (NCC 1964)

INDONESIA

Rear Admiral Walujo SUGITO
Colonel Abdul MADJID (NCC 1971)

IRAN

Rear Admiral Houshang ARYANPOUR
Rear Admiral Kamal HABIBELAHI (NCC 1968)

IRELAND

Captain Peter KAVANAGH

ITALY

Vice Admiral Gino DE GIORGIO (NCC 1961)
Captain Pietro SCAGLIUSI

Vice Admiral Kiyonori KUNISHIMA (NCC 1962) (OBSERVER)
Rear Admiral Hideo KATORI (NCC 1966) (OBSERVER)

KOREA

COMO AN, Pyong Ki

LEBANON

Lieutenant Colonel Fares LAHOUD (NCC 1974)

NETHERLANDS

Vice Admiral E. ROEST
Captain Pieter J. DIERX

NEW ZEALAND

Rear Admiral E.C. THORNE, CBE
Captain K. Michael SAULL

NORWAY

Rear Admiral Oddmund P. AKENES

PAKISTAN

COMO Karamat Rahman NIAZI
Captain Khan Hasan ZIA

PARAGUAY

Captain Ruben Dario LEZCANO

PHILIPPINES

COMO Ernesto R. OGBINAR

SPAIN

Vice Admiral Luis AREVALO Pelluz

SWEDEN

Vice Admiral B.G.G. LUNDVALL
LtGeneral Bo WESTIN

THAILAND

Admiral KAWEE Singha
Vice Admiral KET Santivejkul (NCC 1962)

TUNISIA

Captain Bechir JEDIDI (NCC 1972)

TURKEY

Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003600120001-3

Rear Admiral Dogan TOKTAMIS
Captain Mustafa TURUNCOGLU

UNITED KINGDOM

Admiral Sir Andrew M. LEWIS, KCB
Rear Admiral J.H.F. EBERLE

VENEZUELA

Rear Admiral Enrique DOMINGUEZ Garcia
Rear Admiral Ernesto REYES Leal

VIETNAM

Rear Admiral Tran Van CHON (NCC 1960)
Lieutenant General Vinh LOC

COMNAVSOUTH

Admiral Giuseppe PIGHINI (NCC 1958) (OBSERVER)

UNITED STATES

Under Secretary of the Navy, Mr. J. William MIDDENDORF, II (10/18)
Admiral Elmo R. ZUMWALT, Jr., U.S. Navy (All week, except Tues A.M. & Ret Tues. P.M.)
Admiral Richard G. COLBERT, U.S. Navy (Former Dir., NCC 1957-58) (Pres. 1968-71)(All Week)
Vice Admiral Stansfield TURNER, U.S. Navy (All week)
Vice Admiral Julien J. LE BOURGEOIS, U.S. Navy (All week)
Vice Admiral Malcolm W. CAGLE, U.S. Navy (10/18 and 10/19 only)
Vice Admiral William W. BEHRENS, U.S. Navy (10/17)
Rear Admiral Charles S. WILLIAMS, U.S. Navy (All week)
Rear Admiral Charles D. GROJEAN, U.S. Navy (All week)
Vice Admiral Benjamin F. ENGEL, U.S.C.G. (10/15 and 10/16)
Rear Admiral James A. PALMER, U.S.C.G. (All week)
Captain Joseph A. D'EMIDIO, U.S. Navy (All week)
Mr. Joseph E. KASPUTYS (10/18)
Mr. Herbert S. OKUN
Vice Admiral John T. HAYWARD, U.S. Navy (Ret.) (All week)
Vice Admiral Raymond E. PEET, U.S. Navy (1 or 2 days)
Captain Clarence C. HOBDY, U.S.C.G.
Captain Robert W. DURFEY, U.S.C.G.
Captain Anthony F. FUGARO, U.S.C.G.
Commander Harry J. RECKITT, U.S.C.G.
Lieutenant Commander Peter A. JOSEPH, U.S.C.G.

2 OCTOBER 1973

OTHER NON-PARTICIPANTS AND OBSERVER PERSONNEL

GERMANY

Captain Weise, Naval Attache
LCDR Reiss, Aide

GREECE

Captain Douzinas, Naval Attache (Observer) (NCC 1970)
LCDR Kavallieros - Aide

THAILAND

LCDR WICHITIR Chumnkarn - Aide

VIETNAM

CAPT Nguyen Van Tai, Flag Secretary to CNO
LCDR Van Trung Quan - Personal Aide

COMNAVSOUTH

CDR F. Ruggerio - Aide

15 October 1973

REMARKS FOR 3ISS

I. Need not be reminded that our task is to be prepared to meet the military threat.

Each accustomed to evaluating the military threat we face.

Each has a somewhat different military threat to consider but all some common element.

I - not presume - Z give his wide ranging perspective - Hope to hear from many of you.

II. Like to suggest - New threats sneaking up on all of us - threats we have in common. Also we do not discuss often or treat systematically - but which could erode our capability to handle the primary military threat.

A. One of those stems from the rapidly increasing efforts around the world to tap the resources of the oceans.

1. • Navigation

There are today already 15,000 off-shore oil rigs - concentrated few areas - these each have tanks and pipelines, some of which are submerged and some of which are on the surface.

• Some sort of rules will be soon mandatory for safety and navigation - states with exclusive rights for

resource development could well attempt to use rules of navigation as a way of excluding other shipping from this zone, despite any rules we may make on freedom of transit.

In short, we naval types may assume that if there are provisions for freedom of transit or passage in whatever law of the sea we develop our rights of movement will be protected. This simply may not be adequate.

2. Naval Tactics

- When look closer to our professional skills, is it possible that there will be so many platforms in some areas that the resulting noise or obstructions in the water will cause particular problems in ASW?

3. Sovereignty

- What can we expect our political leaders to demand of us in enforcement of rights of sovereignty over resources of the ocean. How do we avoid conflicts from developing over jurisdictional disputes on resource development?

Should we not be concerned that our ability to work together against the primary military threat can be endangered by disputes over ocean resources?

Do we not even have to be concerned that terrorism and sabotage of ocean platforms could disrupt friendships and cooperative naval efforts.

4. Another threat. Will internal national pressures to protect commercial sea bed interests force reallocations of naval resources and even redesign of naval forces?

- There is a danger that we could be forced into a lot of patrol and protection duties that might detract seriously from training and deployments.
- There is also a danger that the design of our forces might be optimized for these purposes rather combat.

Must be prepared to ensure that such pressures do not impinge war fighting capabilities.

B. Second area of threat is from the drive for ecology.

1. Obvious problems of budgetary impact.

We Navies are conspicuous targets - even though not major offenders.

2. Threats to freedom of movement from ecological rulings -

Unintentional -

Machiavellian -

e.g. rules against vessels with ordnance and av gas - i.e. carriers.

C. Euphoria.

Threat today to over optimistic sense of euphoria of detente.

- Detente is not a black and white affair. It is a fragile and precarious effort to develop trust and confidence over time.
- Vital that our free nations maintain a sense of cohesion, friendship and cooperation as we test detente.

1. Cooperation among the free nations of the world on military matters during the past 25 years has been particularly good.

2. With the arrival of an atmosphere of detente there has come a lesser interest in military matters. The free nations, however, are going to

find it necessary to cooperate in areas of economics, trade, tariffs, and diplomacy. Perhaps if we can set an example of international military cooperation on non-military matters such as ecology, safety of life, etc. could be a help in building cooperation in other fields and in so doing improve interest and respect in our own activities.

D. Fourth common threat we face is the financial and personnel problems in a atmosphere of detente.

Cooperative naval actions may help in both directions - that is generate public support and give individuals in naval service a sense of participation in a desirable activity.

Lots of opportunities.

1. Protection of life at sea.
2. Weather prediction.
3. Protection against terrorism at sea and in the air.
4. Enforcement of ecological rules.
5. Enforcement of other rules of international law.

Note example of how much favorable publicity and sense of easing of tensions has been generated by U.S. - Soviet joint space effort.

Our ability to maintain the forces we need to meet the primary threat is on the line - we all know how serious it would be to unilaterally disarm today.

Navies of the World will have greater responsibilities and more freedom to deter and persuade than air or ground forces.

We must look at every technique to preserve our capabilities.

13 October 1973

OUTLINE OF REMARKS

FOR

3ISS

I. Our task is to be prepared to meet the military threat.

Each accustomed to evaluating the military threat we face

Each has a somewhat different military threat to

consider but all some common element

I - not presume - Z give his wide ranging perspective-

Hope to hear from many of you.

II. Like to suggest - New threats sneaking up on all of us -

threats we have in common. Threats we do not discuss often or treat systematically - but which could erode our capability to handle the primary military threat.

A. Threats from the rapidly increasing efforts around the world to tap the resources of the oceans.

1. • Navigation

There are today already 15,000 off-shore oil rigs - concentrated few areas - these each have tanks and pipelines, some of which are submerged and some of which are on the surface.

• Some sort of rules will be soon mandatory for safety and navigation - states with exclusive rights for resource development could well attempt to use rules of navigation as a way of excluding other shipping from this zone, despite any rules we may make on freedom of transit.

In short, we naval types may assume that if there are provisions for freedom of transit or passage in whatever law of the sea we develop our rights of movement will be protected. This simply may not be adequate.

2. Naval Tactics

- When look closer to our professional skills, is it possible that there will be so many platforms in some areas that the resulting noise in the water that will cause particular probelms in ASW?

3. Sovereignty

- What can we expect our political leaders to demand of us in enforcement of rights of sovereignty over resources of the ocean - especially if these rights are considerably extended? How does a minor or non-naval nation, for instance, protect its rights in an exclusive resource zone? How do we avoid conflicts from developing over jurisdictional disputes on resource development - should we not be concerned that our ability to work together against

the primary military threat can be endangered by disputes over ocean resources?

Do we not even have to be concerned at terrorism and sabotage of ocean platforms that could disrupt friendships and cooperative naval efforts.

- National or terrorist sabotage of undersea resource development activities looks appealingly easy and could consume extensive naval resources to defend against.

4. Will national pressures to protect commerical sea bed interests force reallocations of naval resources and a redesign of naval forces?

- There is a threat that we could be forced into a lot of patrol and protection duties that might detract seriously from training and deployments.
- There is also a threat that the design of our forces might be optimized against the wrong threat.
- Will we want more surface ships - or can surface ships protect these various rights?
- Will we want more small ships and faster ships?
- What about the Air Force and air surveillance of these zones and satellites?

Can we accept such pressures and still retain war fighting capabilities.

B. Second area of threat is from the drive for ecology

1. Obvious problems of budgetary impact.

We Navies are conspicuous targets - even though not major offenders.

2. Threats to freedom of movement from ecological rulings -
Unintentional -

Machiavellain -

e.g. rules against vessels with ordnance and av
gas - i.e. carriers

C. Euphoria -

Threat today to over optimistic sense of euphoria of detente.

- Detente is not a black and white affair. It is a fragile and precarious effort to develop trust and confidence.
- Vital that our free nations maintain a sense of cohesion, friendship and cooperation as we test the winds of detente.
 1. Cooperation among the free nations of the world during the past 25 years has been particularly good in the military sphere.
 2. With the arrival of an atmosphere of detente and lesser interest in military matters the free nations are going to find it even more necessary to cooperate in areas of economics, trade tariffs, and

3. Military international cooperation on non-military matters such as ecology, safety of life, etc. could be a help in building from our example of military cooperation into cooperation in other fields.
- D. Third Common threat that of lack of understanding of publics & politicians of need for military force in era of detente and primary focus on economic achievements.

All face both financial and personnel problems in varying degrees.

Cooperative naval actions may help in both directions - that is generate public support and give individuals in naval service a sense of participation in a desirable activity

1. Protection of life at sea
2. Weather prediction
3. Protection against terrorism at sea and in the air.
4. Enforcement of ecological protection
5. Enforcement of other rules of international law
- 6.
- 7.

Note example of how much favorable publicity and sense of easing of tensions has been generated by U.S. - Soviet joint space effort.

Our ability to maintain the forces we need to meet the primary threat is on the line - we all know how serious it would be to unilaterally disarm today

Navies of the World will have greater responsibilities and more freedom to deter and persuade than air or ground forces.

We must look at every technique to preserve our capabilities.

13 October 1973

OUTLINE OF REMARKS

FOR

3ISS

I. Our task is to be prepared to meet the military threat.

Each accustomed to evaluating the military threat we face

Each has a somewhat different military threat to

consider but all some common element

I - not presume - Z give his wide ranging perspective-

Hope to hear from many of you.

II. Like to suggest - New threats sneaking up on all of us -

threats we have in common. Threats we do not discuss often

or treat systematically - but which could erode our

capability to handle the primary military threat.

A. Threats from the rapidly increasing efforts around
the world to tap the resources of the oceans.

1. • Navigation

There are today already 15,000 off-shore

oil rigs - concentrated few areas - these each

have tanks and pipelines, some of which are

submerged and some of which are on the surface.

• Some sort of rules will be soon mandatory for
safety and navigation - states with exclusive
rights for resource development could well
attempt to use rules of navigation as a way
of excluding other shipping from this zone,
despite any rules we may make on freedom of
transit.

In short, we naval types may assume that if there are provisions for freedom of transit or passage in whatever law of the sea we develop our rights of movement will be protected. This simply may not be adequate.

2. Naval Tactics

- When look closer to our professional skills, is it possible that there will be so many platforms in some areas that the resulting noise in the water that will cause particular probelms in ASW?

3. Sovereignty

- What can we expect our political leaders to demand of us in enforcement of rights of sovereignty over resources of the ocean - especially if these rights are considerably extended? How does a minor or non-naval nation, for instance, protect its rights in an exclusive resource zone? How do we avoid conflicts from developing over jurisdictional disputes on resource development - should we not be concerned that our ability to work together against

the primary military threat can be endangered by disputes over ocean resources?

Do we not even have to be concerned at terrorism and sabotage of ocean platforms that could disrupt friendships and cooperative naval efforts.

- National or terrorist sabotage of undersea resource development activities looks appealingly easy and could consume extensive naval resources to defend against.

4. Will national pressures to protect commerical sea bed interests force reallocations of naval resources and a redesign of naval forces?

- There is a threat that we could be forced into a lot of patrol and protection duties that might detract seriously from training and deployments.
- There is also a threat that the design of our forces might be optimized against the wrong threat.
- Will we want more surface ships - or can surface ships protect these various rights?
- Will we want more small ships and faster ships?
- What about the Air Force and air surveillance of these zones and satellites?

Can we accept such pressures and still retain war fighting capabilities.

B. Second area of threat is from the drive for ecology

1. Obvious problems of budgetary impact.

We Navies are conspicuous targets - even though not major offenders.

2. Threats to freedom of movement from ecological rulings -
Unintentional -

Machiavellian -

e.g. rules against vessels with ordnance and av
gas - i.e. carriers

C. Euphoria

Threat today to over optimistic sense of euphoria of detente.

- Detente is not a black and white affair. It is a fragile and precarious effort to develop trust and confidence.
- Vital that our free nations maintain a sense of cohesion, friendship and cooperation as we test the winds of detente.

1. Cooperation among the free nations of the world

during the past 25 years has been particularly good in the military sphere.

2. With the arrival of an atmosphere of detente and lesser interest in military matters the free nations are going to find it even more necessary to cooperate in areas of economics, trade tariffs, and

diplomacy. Unless we build such mutual areas to help replace military cooperative efforts we may well be in trouble.

3. Military international cooperation on non-military matters such as ecology, safety of life, etc. could be a help in building from our example of military cooperation into cooperation in other fields.

D. Third Common threat that of lack of understanding of publics & politicians of need for military force in era of detente and primary focus on economic achievements.

All face both financial and personnel problems in varying degrees.

Cooperative naval actions may help in both directions - that is generate public support and give individuals in naval service a sense of participation in a desirable activity

1. Protection of life at sea
2. Weather prediction
3. Protection against terrorism at sea and in the air.
4. Enforcement of ecological protection
5. Enforcement of other rules of international law
- 6.
- 7.

Note example of how much favorable publicity and sense of easing of tensions has been generated by U.S. - Soviet joint space effort.

Our ability to maintain the forces we need to meet the primary threat is on the line - we all know how serious it would be to unilaterally disarm today

Navies of the World will have greater responsibilities and more freedom to deter and persuade than air or ground forces.

We must look at every technique to preserve our capabilities.

IDEAS FOR INTERNATIONAL SEAPOWER SYMPOSIUM SPEECH

1. Problems at sea which may require international cooperation:

• Navigation

There are 15,000 off-shore rigs now - these have tanks and pipelines, some of which are submerged and some of which are on the surface.

- Some sort of rules will be mandatory - states with exclusive rights for resource development could use rules of navigation as a way of excluding other shipping from this zone, despite any rules we may make on freedom of transit.

In short, navies may think that freedom of transit provisions will protect their rights but this may not be adequate.

2. Sovereignty

- How does a minor or non-naval nation protect its rights in an exclusive resource zone? If it elects to nationalize resource development, how does it enforce this?

3. Sabotage

- National or terrorist sabotage of undersea resource development activities looks appealingly easy.

4. Naval Tactics.

- Will there be so many platforms and so much noise in the water as a result that there will be particular problems in ASW?

5. Ecology - the problem of blow-outs.

6. Conflicts between oil exploration and fishing

- For instance bottom dragging for fish can interfere with submerged pipelines.
- Most of the oil resources are in the same areas as the fishing resources.

7. Design of navies.

- Will we want more surface ships - or can surface ships protect these various rights?
- Will we want more small ships and faster ships?

- What about the Air Force and air surveillance of these zones and satellites?

8. There are about 2,200 billion barrels of oil estimated in off-shore deposits, about half of which may be recoverable. By 1980, a combined consumption of the U.S., Japan, and Europe will be about 25 billion barrels a year.

- The present limit on drilling is about 600 feet. Costs go up exponentially as you move into deeper water.
- At some point the trade-off in developing tar sands or shale oil may preclude going any deeper.

IDEAS FOR INTERNATIONAL SEAPOWER SYMPOSIUM SPEECH

1. Problems at sea which may require international cooperation:

- Navigation

There are 15,000 off-shore rigs now - these have tanks and pipelines, some of which are submerged and some of which are on the surface.

- Some sort of rules will be mandatory - states with exclusive rights for resource development could use rules of navigation as a way of excluding other shipping from this zone, despite any rules we may make on freedom of transit.

In short, navies may think that freedom of transit provisions will protect their rights but this may not be adequate.

2. Sovereignty

- How does a minor or non-naval nation protect its rights in an exclusive resource zone? If it elects to nationalize resource development, how does it enforce this?

3. Sabotage

- National or terrorist sabotage of undersea resource development activities looks appealingly easy.

4. Naval Tactics.

- Will there be so many platforms and so much noise in the water as a result that there will be particular problems in ASW?

5. Ecology - the problem of blow-outs.

6. Conflicts between oil exploration and fishing

- For instance bottom dragging for fish can interfere with submerged pipelines.
- Most of the oil resources are in the same areas as the fishing resources.

7. Design of navies.

- Will we want more surface ships - or can surface ships protect these various rights?
- Will we want more small ships and faster ships?

- What about the Air Force and air surveillance of these zones and satellites?
- 8. There are about 2,200 billion barrels of oil estimated in off-shore deposits, about half of which may be recoverable. By 1980, a combined consumption of the U.S., Japan, and Europe will be about 25 billion barrels a year.
 - The present limit on drilling is about 600 feet. Costs go up exponentially as you move into deeper water.
 - At some point the trade-off in developing tar sands or shale oil may preclude going any deeper.

OUTLINE OF REMARKS

FOR

3ISS

I. Our task is to be prepared to meet the threat.

Each accustomed to evaluating the military threat we face

Each has a different military threat to consider but all
some common element

II. New threats sneaking up on all of us - threats we have in
common. Threats we do not discuss often or treat systematically
- but which could erode our capability to handle the primary
threat

A. Threats from the development of the means of tapping
the resources of the oceans

1. • Navigation

There are 15,000 off-shore rigs now - these
have tanks and pipelines, some of which are
submerged and some of which are on the surface.

- Some sort of rules will be mandatory - states
with exclusive rights for resource development
could use rules of navigation as a way of
excluding other shipping from this zone,
despite any rules we may make on freedom
of transit.

In short, navies may think that if there are freedom of transit provisions in the law of the sea their rights of movement will be protected but this may not be adequate.

2. Naval Tactics

- Will there be so many platforms and so much noise in the water as a result that there will be particular problems in ASW?

3. Sovereignty

- How does a minor or non-naval nation protect its rights in an exclusive resource zone? If it elects to nationalize resource development, how does it enforce this?

How do we avoid conflicts from developing over jurisdictional disputes on resource development - should we not be concerned that our ability to work together against the primary military threat can be endangered by disputes over ocean resources.

Do we not even have to be concerned at terrorism and sabotage that is intended to disrupt friendships and cooperative naval efforts.

- National or terrorist sabotage of undersea resource development activities looks appealingly easy.

4. Will national pressures to protect commerical sea bed interests force a redesign of naval forces?

- Will we want more surface ships - or can surface ships protect these various rights?
- Will we want more small ships and faster ships?
- What about the Air Force and air surveillance of these zones and satellites?

Can we accept such pressures and still retain war fighting capabilities

B. Threats from the drive for ecology

1. Obvious problem of budgetary impact

We are conspicuous targets - even though not major offenders

2. Threat to freedom of movement from ecological rulings -

Unintentional

Machiavellain -

e.g. rules against vessels with ordance and av gas - i.e. carriers

C. Threats from lack of understanding of need for military force in detente -

Both financial and personnel problems
Cooperative naval actions may help in both
directions - that is generate public support and
give individuals in the service a sense of participation
in a desirable activity

1. Protection of life
2. Weather prediction
3. Protection against terrorism
- 4.
- 5.

Note example of how much favorable publicity and sense
of easing of tensions has been generated by U.S. - Soviet
joint space effort.

Our ability to maintain the forces we need to meet
the primary threat is on the line - we all know
how serious it would be to unilaterally disarm today
Navies of the world will have greater responsibilities
and more freedom to deter and persuade than
air or ground forces.

We must look at every technique to preserve
our capabilities.